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Following the G20 leaders' statement at the London Summit in April 2009 inviting 
the ILO "working with other relevant organizations, to assess the actions taken and those 
required for the future [in the areas of employment and social protection policies]", a joint 
ILO/WB Inventory of policy responses to the 2008 financial and economic crisis was one 
of the initiatives adopted by the ILO. The Inventory follows the framework of policies 
provided by the ILO's Global Jobs Pact and contains information of policy responses in 
four  major  areas  (macroeconomics  and  employment,  social  protection,  international 
labour standards and social dialogue) for 77 countries. For all recorded measures, the 
Inventory database gives, whenever possible, information on costs, time frame, target 
population,  number  of  beneficiaries,  impact  and  whether  the  measures  resulted  from 
social dialogue.  
The  Inventory  project  has  been  managed  in  the  Economic  and  Labour  Market 
Analysis Department of the ILO by Catherine Saget (Senior Economist, and manager of 
the project) and Moazam Mahmood (Director), under the responsibility of Jose Manuel 
Salazar (Executive Director, Employment Sector). On the World Bank side, the project 
was  managed  by  Friederike  Rother  (Operations  Officer),  David  Newhouse  (Labour 
Economist)  and  David  Robalino  (Director)  of  the  Labour  Markets  Team,  under  the 
responsibility of Arup Banerji (Director, Social Protection and Labour). On the Social 
Dialogue side of the ILO, France Auer (Coordinator) and Susan Hayter (Senior Industrial 
and  Employment  Relations  Specialist)  provided  guidance  and  support  in  the  data 
collection and the analysis. 
This paper seeks to identify the conditions in which a social dialogue response to the 
economic  and  financial  crisis  emerges  at  the  national  level.  Its  primary  source  of 
information  uses  the  ILO/World  Bank  Inventory  standardized  questionnaire  on  44 
countries covering the period mid-2008–mid-2010. The analysis adopts an innovative 
Boolean methodology which focused on identifying necessary and sufficient conditions 
for national dialogue to emerge. The main results of the analysis stress the importance of 
freedom of association as a necessary condition for a social dialogue response to the crisis 
to emerge. On the opposite side, the severity of the crisis, and the weakness of trade 
unions, are associated with a lower occurrence of social dialogue.  
The Swiss Secretariat of the Economy (SECO) provided financial support to the 
Inventory project to the ILO and to the WB through the Multi Donor Trust Fund. This 
support is gratefully acknowledged.  
We  would  like  to  thank  the  members  of  the  respective  teams  for  excellent 
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1. Introduction
1 
The global financial crisis, which exploded in late 2008, has led governments around 
the world, and particularly in Western countries, to engage in a complicated balancing act 
of trying to reconcile different policy goals. On the one hand, there is a need to minimize 
the  social  consequences  of  the  crisis,  protect  employment  as  much  as  possible  and 
strengthen the social safety nets for those who lose their jobs and fall through the cracks. 
On the other hand, the need to intervene massively to restore the balance sheets of banks 
and other financial institutions, combined with the shortfall in public finances that always 
accompany  a  recession,  has  created  opposite  incentives  to  cut  public  expenditures, 
increase fiscal inflows, and reduce public debt. 
It may be argued that the response to the crisis has played itself out in two stages. In 
an early, Keynesian phase, the main focus has been on minimizing the employment and 
social  consequences  of  the  crisis.  Beginning  with  2009,  however,  pushed  by  jittery 
financial markets preoccupied by the unsustainable debt position of particular Euro-area 
countries, governments seem to have returned to a more “orthodox” position. They have 
become much more concerned with debt reduction and fiscal consolidation than with 
social sustainability (Torres, 2010). 
Social  dialogue  has  played  an  important  role  in  the  response  to  the  crisis, 
particularly in the early phase. In several countries, at either the national or the sectoral 
levels, bipartite or tripartite negotiations have led to “pain-sharing” agreements in which 
workers have accepted to work fewer hours with a commensurate reduction in pay in an 
effort to minimize labour shedding and preserve human capital. In turn, employers have 
promised to resort to layoffs only as an extrema ratio, when all other possibilities (for 
example  internal  flexibility,  training)  have  been  exhausted.  The  government  has 
intervened to partially compensate the workers for income losses, extend unemployment 
insurance, and promote the fast requalification and movement of workers from declining 
firms and sectors to expanding ones. 
The ILO has consistently promoted a social dialogue approach to crisis response, 
arguing  that  it  is  both  more  efficient  and  more  equitable,  as  it  protects  the  weakest 
segments of society. It also contributes to support aggregate demand at a time when the 
“paradox of thrift”, i.e. individual decisions to save more, leading to an aggregate decline 
in  total  savings  and  investment,  threatens  to  plunge  the  world  into  a  pernicious 
deflationary spiral. In 2009 the ILO constituents adopted a Global Jobs Pact crucially 
centered on social dialogue at both the national and international level (ILO, 2009b). 
However, not all countries have resorted to social dialogue in shaping their response to 
the crisis. In apparently similar circumstances some have and others have not. Sometimes 
a  social  dialogue  approach  has  been  attempted,  but  it  has  eventually  failed  and  the 
government has proceeded unilaterally. 
This paper seeks to identify the conditions in which a social dialogue response to the 
crisis emerges. It uses information on 44 countries around the world.2 This was collected 
 
 
1 Lucio Baccaro is a Full Professor of Macro-Sociology at the Department of Sociology of the 
Faculty of Social and Economic Science, University of Geneva, Switzerland. Stefan Heeb has 
been working as an external collaborator for the ILO/World Bank Inventory of policy responses to 
the crisis project. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer, and to Catherine Saget for comments 
on a preliminary version of this paper. The views expressed are our responsibility and do not 
necessarily represent those of the ILO.   
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by the ILO through a standardized questionnaire addressed to country or regional experts 
(ILO, 2010a), as well as various primary and secondary sources collected by the authors. 
The analysis adopts an innovative Boolean methodology focused on identifying necessary 
and sufficient conditions. This methodology is perfectly attuned to a complex notion of 
causality in which the same outcome may be produced by different configurations of 
factors (Ragin, 1987; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). 
The main conclusions of the analysis are that: positively, freedom of association is a 
necessary condition for social dialogue; negatively, a combination of a crisis that hits 
hard,  together  with  organizationally  weak  unions,  or  a  crisis  with  a  lesser  and  not 
particularly  far-reaching  impact,  together  with  strong  unions,  is  often  sufficient  to 
produce an absence of social dialogue. The first seems to be a case of the government 
being hard-pressed by economic emergency to ignore trade union demands, with unions 
not being strong enough to force consideration of such demands. The second, where the 
government is afraid that involving trade unions in a concerted policy response would 
imply paying too high a price to them and would endanger economic adjustment. 
The remainder of the report is organized as follows. Firstly, there is a review of the 
recent evolution of national social dialogue. Secondly, there is a discussion on the coding 
of the social dialogue variable and of the independent variables: tripartite legacy, serious 
crisis,  union  strength,  and  freedom  of  association.  Thirdly,  the  Boolean  analysis  is 
conducted  under  different  assumptions.  Fourthly,  there  are  ten  brief  case  study 
illustrations and, finally, a summary of results. 
2. The evolution of national social dialogue 
in recent years 
Until  few  years  ago,  the  argument  that  national  social  dialogue  had  been  made 
obsolete  by  a  series  of  socioeconomic  transformations  –  globalization,  European 
integration,  technological  change,  and  a  generalized  employer  offensive  –  was  fairly 
common in the literature (Schmitter, 1989; Streeck and Schmitter, 1991; Gobeyn, 1993; 
Streeck,  1993; Thelen,  1994,  pp.:  387,  410 and  passim;  Locke,  1995;  Iversen,  1999; 
Iversen et al., 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Yet,  national  social  dialogue  not  only  did  not  die,  but  even  experienced  an 
unexpected renaissance in the 1990s and beyond in the form of “social pacts” (Regini, 
1997; Wallerstein et al., 1997; Perez, 2000; Compston, 2002; Molina and Rhodes, 2002; 
Baccaro,  2003;  Hassel,  2003;  Traxler,  2004;  Hamann  and  Kelly,  2007;  Baccaro  and 
Simoni, 2008; Hassel, 2009). If an index of unions and employers’ involvement in public 
policy-making is constructed and plotted over time, it is found that both government 
propensity to negotiate with the social partners, and the frequency of agreements, actually 
slightly increased in Western Europe in the past 30 years (Baccaro and Simoni, 2008). In 
addition,  national  social  dialogue  began  to  spread  outside  its traditional  homeland  of 
continental Europe, to be practiced in other countries as well, such as South Africa and 
South Korea (Papadakis, 2006; Baccaro and Lim, 2007). 
It is possible that previous research had exaggerated the impact of a few highly 
symbolic events like the decline of centralized bargaining and tripartite policy-making in 
 
 
2 This paper uses the first available 44 country surveys out of a total of 77 that were carried out 
over a period of eight months.  
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a beacon country such as Sweden. It was, therefore, incorrectly concluded that national 
social dialogue was a relic of the past. However, there is no doubt that the agreements 
signed  in  western  European  countries  in  the  1990s  differed  considerably  from  those 
which had become a distinctive trait of Central European and Scandinavian countries in 
the 1960s and 1970s. These were based on a form of “political exchange” between unions 
and governments (Pizzorno, 1978), whereby the unions committed to wage moderation 
(thereby contributing to disinflation) and the governments compensated their sacrifice 
with more generous social programmes and working-time reductions. This led to greater 
income and wage equality and “decommodification” of public services (Korpi, 1978; 
Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
This type of political exchange is now virtually absent. The new social dialogue has 
more or less entirely relinquished the redistributive and decommodifying traits of the old. 
Pressed by restrictive international macroeconomic frameworks, governments are unable 
or unwilling to compensate union forbearance and moderation with “side payments” in 
other domains. Union virtue has become a prize in itself. 
In fact, the content of the national social dialogue agreements of the 1990s and 
2000s was more or less neo-liberal and included the following: 
·  systematic compression of wage growth below productivity growth to improve 
cost competitiveness; 
·  labour  market  liberalization  and  the  reduction  of  employment  protection 
(supposed to lower unemployment rates); 
·  welfare  state  reforms  reducing  benefits,  tightening  eligibility  conditions,  and 
shifting a large part of risks from the state (or the employers) to workers or 
citizens.   
This does not mean there was no difference between a policy reform negotiated 
through  social  dialogue  and  one  implemented  unilaterally  by  the  government  under 
pressure from the international markets. However, national social dialogue was only able 
to blunt neo-liberalism; not provide an alternative to it (Fraile, 2009). Overall, the new 
national social dialogue helped governments rally the popular consensus needed to pass 
unpopular and electorally-threatening reforms (Hamann and Kelly, 2007; Baccaro and 
Simoni, 2008; Avdagic, 2010). Governments that, due to limited parliamentary strength 
or  electoral  competition,  were  unable  or  unwilling  to  unilaterally  impose  a  series  of 
reforms, forced on them by international economic conditions, found that social pacts 
were  an  expedient  way  to  activate  an  alternative,  extra-parliamentary  (union-based) 
mechanism  of  consensus  mobilization  (Rhodes,  1996;  Streeck,  2000;  Rhodes,  2001; 
Streeck, 2006). 
When looking at the response to the current global financial crisis, and at the role 
that social dialogue plays in it, it is this more recent type that is at stake. That is, one that 
does not look for fundamental policy alternatives, but seeks to spread and share the pain 
and,  in  so  doing,  increases  the  legitimacy  and  political  acceptability  of  the  reform 
package. This type of social dialogue seeks to keep labour shedding within acceptable 
proportions. For example, through work-sharing measures, which limit the employment 
and social consequences of public sector downsizing, and by strengthening the social 
safety net by extending the duration of unemployment benefits. 
Not all countries resort to social dialogue in orchestrating their response to the crisis. 
Previous research suggests that the presence or the absence of a social dialogue response 
should be dependent on four factors: 1) a legacy of tripartite policy-making; 2) a serious 
economic  crisis  that  fundamentally  threatens  the  country’s  economic  and  financial 
viability; 3) the organizational strength of the union movement; 4) independently of the 
unions’ organizational strength, whether or not they are allowed to organize freely.  
  4 
A country that has used social dialogue to process public policy in the past will 
probably also use it to respond to the financial crisis. All other things being equal, a far-
reaching crisis should induce a government to reach out to the social partners in order to 
both cushion the effects of the crisis itself and formulate a policy response that is socially 
and politically more acceptable and manageable. The role played by the organizational 
strength of the unions is likely to be contingent on other factors (Baccaro and Lim, 2007; 
Baccaro and Simoni, 2008; Avdagic, 2010). If the crisis is deep and the unions strong, 
their ability to mobilize against a unilateral government plan and, potentially block its 
implementation, should increase the government’s willingness to negotiate. This would 
make a social dialogue response more likely. However, if the crisis is not far-reaching 
and the unions are organizationally weak, the government may either ignore them and 
proceed unilaterally, or, if a corporatist legacy is present, decide to go through the motion 
of social dialogue as a symbolic gesture. The opposite combination of a crisis that is not 
very serious, together with unions that are organizationally strong may also tend to reduce 
the incentives for a government to negotiate its policy response. They may fear that the 
trade  unions  will  be  able  to  capitalize  on  their  strength  and  impose  their  views 
unilaterally. Finally, freedom of association seems prima facie a necessary condition for a 
social dialogue response to the crisis. Only unions that are genuinely free to enter into an 
agreement with the government and the employer associations can really contribute to 
mobilizing  consensus  for  unpopular  reforms.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  a  social 
dialogue response is also possible in countries where no genuine freedom of association 
exists.   
In the remainder of the paper, the determinants of social dialogue are examined 
through  a  Boolean  analysis  of  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  (Ragin,  1987). 
Information was collected for 44 countries in various regions of the world and at different 
levels of development: eight African (Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 
Rwanda,  Tanzania  and  Uganda);  ten  American  (Argentina,  Brazil,  Canada,  Chile, 
Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Mexico,  Peru,  USA  and  Uruguay);  two  Caribbean  (Jamaica, 
Trinidad  and  Tobago);  17  European  (Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  France,  Germany, 
Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Latvia,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Romania,  Russia,  Spain, 
Switzerland,  Sweden,  Serbia  and  United  Kingdom);  and  seven  Asian  (Australia, 
Cambodia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam). 
Boolean analysis, also known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin, 1987), 
combines  features  of  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  research.  As  in  quantitative 
research, the goal is not so much acquiring in-depth knowledge of particular cases, but 
drawing general conclusions about the circumstances in which a particular outcome may 
or may not emerge, based on information from an available sample of cases. Unlike 
quantitative  research,  the  analysis  seeks  to  identify  particular  configurations  of 
circumstances  leading  to  the  outcome  and  not  just  the  average  effect  of  a  particular 
variable (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). Unlike multivariate statistical methods, a Boolean 
approach is perfectly compatible with a complex notion of causality in which there is 
equifinality, and can easily identify different configurations of circumstances leading to 
the same outcome. The approach to measurement taken is typical of qualitative research: 
the presence or absence of a particular quality or trait is assessed and no effort is made to 
measure these characteristics continuously.   
The  Boolean  approach  begins  by  coding  the  various  variables  (independent 
variables: tripartite legacy, serious crisis, strong unions, free unions; dependent variable: 
social dialogue response) as a collection of 1’s (presence) and 0’s (absence).  
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3.   Coding the dependent variable 
The dependent variable, whether or not there was a social dialogue response to the 
financial crisis between 2008 and 2010 (D), is coded as 1 in two circumstances: 1) if there 
is  a  national-level  agreement  among  government,  unions  and  employer  associations; 
and/or 2) even in the absence of a tripartite agreement, if unions and employers play an 
important role in adjustment programmes through sectoral level collective agreements; it 
is coded 0 otherwise. This is based on information collected by the ILO through the 
“Crisis Policy Inventory Questionnaire”, a standardized questionnaire filled out by the 
country or regional experts (ILO, 2010a) as well as on secondary sources, particularly the 
articles published online by Eironline.
3 
The countries in which national-level social dialogue agreements have been signed, 
and that, for this reason, are coded as 1, are nine: South Africa, Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, 
Czech Republic, Netherlands, Poland, Japan and South Korea. Countries in which social 
dialogue played a role mostly at the sectoral level, and which are also coded as 1, are the 
following four: Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Sweden. All other countries are coded as 
0. Table 1 provides details on the coding of the D variable for the various countries.
4 
4.   Coding the independent variables 
Tripartite legacy 
The tripartite legacy variable (L) is coded as 1 if, in the country in question, a social 
pact (peak-level agreement on macroeconomic, social, and/or labour market policy) has 
been signed in the previous ten years. However, even in the absence of an explicit social 
pact, if the country is characterized by “embedded corporatism”, i.e. by an institutional 
system in which public policy is discussed and/or negotiated with the social partners, as a 
matter of routine. 
The countries in the sample, in which a social pact was signed in the previous  ten 
years, and are therefore coded as 1, are: South Africa, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain 
and South Korea. The notion of social pact is interpreted here narrowly and excludes the 
mostly cosmetic agreements signed, for example, in some Eastern European and Latin 
American countries in the past ten years (Ost, 2000; Avdagic, 2005). The countries coded 
as 1 because of their “embedded corporatism” are: Germany, Switzerland and Sweden. 
All other countries are coded as 0. Table 2 reports the country scores on the corporatist 
legacy and other independent variables.  
Serious crisis 
The “seriousness of the crisis” variable (C) is coded as 1 if the rate of growth of 
GDP  is  negative  in  one  or  more  years  between  2008  and  2010  (expected)  and  0 





4 Many thanks to Sabina Avdagic for her help coding the social dialogue variable for the Eastern 
European countries.  
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Using negative GDP growth as an indicator of a serious crisis is not perfect, but 
creates fewer problems of ambiguity than other plausible indicators. In particular, GDP 
growth  seems  less  endogenously-determined  by  the  response  to  the  crisis  than  other 
possible indicators. For example, using the change or the level in unemployment as an 
indicator  of  a  serious  crisis  would  make  its  concept  depend  on  the  social  protection 
system of a particular country. Given the same shock, a country with a weak social safety 
net would experience a higher increase in the unemployment rate than a country with a 
stronger social safety net. Similar considerations also apply to other possible indicators of 
crisis, like public deficit and/or debt.
5 
The countries in which there has not been a serious economic crisis according to the 
above definition (coded as 0) are: Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Poland, Australia, Korea and Vietnam. All 
other countries are coded as 1. It is noteworthy that all European countries except Poland 
have experienced negative growth in at least one year and are, therefore, coded as 1. 
Union Strength 
The union strength variable (S) is coded as 1 if the country’s union density rate 
(union members/workers) is equal to or greater than 20 per cent according to the most 
recent estimates available. Information on union density rates has been collected by the 
authors through consulting various sources. The countries in which the unions can be 
considered organizationally strong according to the above threshold and S is coded as 1 
are:  South  Africa,  Argentina,  Brazil,  Canada,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Russia, Switzerland, Sweden, Serbia and the UK. 
All other countries are coded as 0. 
Freedom of Association 
The freedom of association variable has been coded by consulting the ITUC/ICFTU 
Annual Survey of Trade Union Rights, focusing in particular on effective de facto and de 
jure freedom to organize, freedom of collective bargaining, and freedom of strike.
6 The 
countries in the sample that have been coded as 0, i.e. those where there is no freedom of 
association, are: Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Russia, Serbia, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Vietnam. All other countries have been coded as 1. 
5.   Boolean analysis 
A Boolean analysis is based on possible (logical) combinations of the independent 
variables,  which  in  turn  may  take  a  value  of  1  (presence)  or  0  (absence).  If  an 
independent variable is present, it is indicated by a capital letter (e.g. L); if it is absent, by 
a lower-case letter (e.g. l). Since there are four independent variables, the number of 
 
 
5  Using  a  1/0  indicator  obviously  implies  lumping  together  countries  with  very  different 
macroeconomic situations. As described in the country section (see below), among countries for 
which the seriousness of the crisis is coded as 1 there are countries that had a huge drop in GDP 
(Germany,  Ireland,  Spain,  Hungary,  South  Africa,  Japan)  as  well  as  others  which  were  only 
moderately affected (Switzerland, Brazil). 
6 http://www.icftu.org/list.asp?Order=Type&Type=TURSurvey&Language=EN&Subject=TUR.  
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possible  combinations  of  factors  is  2
n  =  2
4  =  16.  The  matrix  of  the  16  possible 
combinations is reported in Table 3 together with the countries that correspond to the 
particular combinations.  
The  first  row  in  Table  3  corresponds  to  the  combination  lcsf,  i.e.  absence  of  a 
corporatist legacy, absence of a serious crisis, absence of strong unions, and absence of 
freedom of association. Eight countries are characterized by the above combination of 
factors: Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Colombia and Vietnam. 
None of these countries has seen a social dialogue response to the crisis according to the 
information that we collected. This can be expressed formally as lcsf = d. 
The last row in Table 3 corresponds to the opposite combination LCSF, i.e. presence 
of  a  corporatist  legacy,  presence  of  a  serious  crisis,  presence  of  strong  unions,  and 
presence  of  freedom  of  association.  Seven  countries  are  characterized  by  this 
combination:  South  Africa,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Switzerland  and 
Sweden. All except Ireland have seen the emergence of a social dialogue response to the 
crisis. This can be expressed formally as LCSF = D. 
This leads us to the problem of contradictory rows (Ragin, 1987). Not all possible 
combinations of factors are characterized by univocal responses. In some cases, the same 
combination is associated with presence in some countries and absence in others. Yet a 
requirement of a Boolean analysis is that all variables be coded as either 0s or 1s.
7 So, the 
outcome variable is coded in two different ways, one less restrictive and the other more: it 
is coded as 1 if the frequency of positive cases for the row in question is greater than 0, 
i.e. if there is at least one positive case; alternatively, it is coded as 1 if the row frequency 
is greater than 0.5, i.e. if a positive outcome is the most frequent; in all other cases, the 
outcome variable is coded as 0. Strictly speaking, the presence of contradictory rows in a 
Boolean  framework  signals  a  problem  with  the  theoretical  model:  variables  may  be 
omitted variables which would distinguish, if taken into consideration, between positive 
and  negative  cases  within  the  same  row  (logical  combination).  One  possible  omitted 
variable, which future research should take into account, is the strength of government 
(Baccaro and Simoni, 2008; Hamann and Kelly, 2010; Avdagic et al., 2011). In fact, it is 
conceivable that, if a government is firmly in power, has little to fear from the opposition, 
and has sufficient political power to implement the adjustment plan it chooses, it would 
have fewer incentives to engage in a social dialogue than a government that does not have 
the above characteristics. 
Before moving to the analysis of the truth table in Table 3, it is useful to discuss 
briefly the basics of Boolean algebra. There are two operations: Boolean multiplication 
and  Boolean  addition.  The  first  corresponds  to  the  AND  in  formal  logics  or  to  the 
intersection of two sets in set-theory. The intersection (multiplication) AB of two sets A 
and B is a set whose members are both members of A and members of B. The Boolean 
addition corresponds to the OR in formal logics or to the union of two sets. The union 
(addition) A+B of two sets A and B is a set whose members are either members of A or 
members of B. 
 
 
7 A solution to this predicament would be to move from ‘crisp’ to ‘fuzzy’ set methodology. This 
would make it possible to code degrees of membership in a particular category (Ragin, 2000). 
However, a fuzzy-set methodology would require more in-depth knowledge of the cases and a fair 
amount of questionable assumptions in order to calibrate the variables and decide both what the 
tipping  points  between  membership  and  non-membership  are  and  the  various  degrees  of 
membership. While a fuzzy-set extension would be advisable, given the current state of knowledge 
of the particular cases a choice was made to keep the analysis at the Boolean level.        
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The first step in the analysis is to identify the configurations of factors that are 
sufficient to  produce the outcome  of interest,  i.e. a  social  dialogue response (D).  As 
revealed  by  Table  3,  if  the  outcome  is  Frequency>.5  there  are  only  two  possible 




If a broader operationalization of the outcome (Frequency>0) is used then there are 




Not surprisingly, the first is a subset of the second. In words, a social dialogue 
response is produced in countries where freedom of association is guaranteed AND there 
is  no  corporatist  legacy,  the  crisis  is  not  particularly  serious,  and  the  unions  not 
particularly strong (the case of Poland); OR there is no corporatist legacy, the crisis is 
serious, and the unions are weak (the cases of Chile, Jamaica, and Japan); OR there is no 
corporatist legacy, but the crisis is serious and the union are strong (the cases of Brazil 
and the Czech Republic); OR there is a corporatist legacy, but neither the crisis is serious 
nor the unions are strong (the case of Korea); OR there is a corporatist legacy, the crisis is 
serious,  and  the  unions  are  strong  (the  cases  of  South  Africa,  Germany,  Italy, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden).   
One thing that transpires immediately from the above sums of Boolean products is 
that freedom of association (F) appears in all positive combinations, i.e. it is a necessary 
condition for a social dialogue response (Little, 1991). 
It is worth noting at this point that, should one apply standard statistical techniques 
to  the  data  matrix  obtained  by  combining  Table  1  (dependent  variable)  and  Table  2 
(independent variables) – for example by running a logit model – any statistical software 
would return an error message to the effect that ‘freedom of association = 0 perfectly 
predicts social dialogue = 0’ or something similar mentioning “perfect separation”. In 
other  words,  what  is  probably  the  strongest  result  of  the  analysis,  that  freedom  of 
association is a necessary condition for social dialogue, would be treated as a statistical 
mishap. The incriminated observations, those in which freedom of association = 0 and 
social dialogue = 0, would be dropped and the model re-estimated on a smaller (and 
different sample). 
The second step in the analysis is the use of the rules of Boolean algebra to simplify 
the  expressions  if  possible.  Two  rules  are  especially  helpful:  1)  AB+Ab=A,  and  2) 
A+AB=A. The first says that if A is the set of French people and B the set of people living 
in Paris, the sum of the set of French people living in Paris and the set of French people 
not living in Paris is the set of French people tout court. The second, also known as the 
principle of redundance, says that the sum of the set of French people and the set of 
French people living in Paris is the set of French people. 
While (1) cannot be further simplified, applying the rules of Boolean algebra (2) can 
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In other words, a social dialogue response is produced in freedom of association 
countries when there is no corporatist legacy and either the unions are not particularly 
strong or the crisis is serious, or when the crisis is serious and the unions are strong, or 
when the crisis is not serious and the unions are not strong. 
We now use the De Morgan's rule to identify the conditions leading to the non-
emergence of a social dialogue response. The De Morgan rule is a theorem of Boolean 
algebra stating that: 
 
S=Ab+cD ≡ s=(a+B)(D+c) 
 
where '≡' stands for 'logically equivalent.'  Applying De Morgan's rule to (1) gives 








There are four configurations in which a social dialogue response would not emerge: 
1) the absence of trade union freedom per se is a sufficient condition for non-emergence; 
2) when the crisis is serious and the unions weak, presumably because the crisis generates 
such a sense of urgency that the governments do not bother do negotiate with weak trade 
unions; 3) when the unions are strong and the crisis not particularly serious, presumably 
because  the  governments  are  worried  that  unions  would  impose  too  high  a  price  in 
negotiations; 4) when there is no corporatist legacy. This latter conclusion, however, is 
simply a consequence of the decision to code the outcome as 1 if the majority of cases in 
the row are positive. In fact, there are in the sample cases of positive social dialogue 
response in the absence of a tripartite legacy (Poland, Chile, Jamaica, Japan, Brazil and 
Czech Republic). As illustrated below, this conclusion will drop out once less restrictive 
assumptions are introduced. 








There are three configurations of circumstances in which a social dialogue response 
would  not  emerge:  a  weak  crisis  accompanied  by  strong  unions;  a  strong  crisis 
accompanied by weak unions in the presence of a tripartite legacy; the absence of trade 
union freedom. Not surprisingly, (7) is a subset of (5). The first configuration, weak crisis 
and strong unions, captures the case of Argentina. The second configuration captures the  
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case of Spain, where there is a corporatist legacy, the crisis hits extremely hard, and the 
unions are weak in organizational terms. The government is forced by economic duress to 
impose a series of conditions (e.g. labour market reform) that the unions are unable to 
accept and decides, therefore, to proceed unilaterally. The third configuration captures the 
cases of various countries such as Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Colombia,  Vietnam,  Costa  Rica,  Trinidad,  Mexico,  Cambodia,  Malaysia,  Thailand, 
Russia and Serbia, in which there is no social dialogue response because there is no 
freedom of association. 
6.   Dealing with limited diversity 
Inspection  of  the truth  table  (Table  3)  reveals that  six  possible  combinations  of 
factors have no support in the data. So far, we have implicitly assumed that they are 
unable  to  produce  the  outcome  of  interest,  i.e.  a  social  dialogue  response.  Now  we 
explicitly examine the plausibility of this assumption. Five out of six missing rows are 
characterized by a value of 0 on freedom of association. For these five configurations it 
seems  plausible  to  assume  that  the  social  dialogue  variable  would  take  a  value  of  0 
because freedom of association has emerged as a necessary condition for social dialogue. 
For the sixth configuration, however, that of corporatist legacy (L), not-so-serious crisis 
(c), strong unions (S), and freedom of association (F), it does not seem straightforward to 
assume  that  such  configuration  would  not  produce  a  social  dialogue  response.  It  is 
possible that it would. We, therefore, impute a value of 1 to the social dialogue variable 
corresponding to this configuration and re-analyse the truth table accordingly. 








Given freedom of association as a necessary condition, a social dialogue response to 
the crisis emergences in five circumstances: 1) when there is a corporatist legacy and the 
unions are strong; 2) when the crisis is serious and the labour movement strong; 3) when 
there is no legacy, but the unions are strong enough; 4) when there is no legacy and the 
unions are weak; 5) when the crisis is not serious and the labour movement weak. The 
latter  is  presumably  a  case  of  routine,  cosmetic  social  dialogue  and  appears  to 
approximate the case of Korea, where it seems to have become customary for the Korea 
Tripartite  Commission to initiate  discussions  among  (some  of) the social  partners on 
current public policy issues. 
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Again, the absence of freedom of association is a sufficient condition for social 
dialogue not to emerge, independent of other circumstances. In addition, social dialogue 
does not emerge when, despite the presence of a corporatist legacy, the crisis hits hard 
and the unions are not strong enough to impose an agreement to government (the case of 
Spain), or vice versa, in a context in which social dialogue is not a policy routine, the 
crisis is not dramatic and the unions are so strong that the government fears having to pay 
too high a price to them. In the next section we provide illustrations based on country 
case studies. 




Germany was hit hard by the global economic crisis: in 2009 its economy contracted 
by 4.9 per cent, although it rebounded in 2010. Unemployment peaked at 8.1 per cent in 
February 2009 after reaching a two-year low of 6.3 per cent in October 2008, and then 
oscillated between 7 and 8 per cent. 
The  country  has  a  tradition  of  corporatist  policy-making:  the  unions  play  an 
important institutional role in the administration of labour market and social policy and 
are generally consulted on major policy decisions. However, national tripartite pacts are 
not a characteristic of German industrial relations. The unionization rate is around 20 per 
cent; the collective bargaining coverage rate is higher because large firms are generally 
still members of employer associations. For this reason the country was coded as hosting 
a strong labour movement. There are no important violations of trade union rights. 
Germany’s response to the financial crisis included tripartite national social dialogue 
only  at  a  consultative  level.  Nonetheless,  the  union  involvement  was  considerable, 
particularly at the sectoral/subnational level, which justifies coding the country as a case 
of  social  dialogue  response.  The  Federal  Chancellor  convened  a  tripartite  summit  in 
December  2008  with  a  view  to  discussing  the  impact  of  the  crisis  on  the  national 
economy and outlining the Federal Government's stimulus package. The results of this 
exchange of views between the tripartite partners were taken into consideration when the 
package of measures was implemented in January 2009. Further high-level conferences 
took place in January and April 2009 along with numerous consultations at the state and 
local levels. All of these consultations focused on protecting employment levels as a 
major shared concern. 
The  main  measure  taken  was  the  extension  of  the  short-time  working  scheme 
(Kurzarbeit), under which the government provided subsidies allowing people to work 
 
 
8 The country chapters cover developments until early 2010. 
9 The case draws on (Demetriades and Kullander, 2009, p. 26; Ghellab, 2009, p. 6; Freyssinet, 
2010, p. 25 ff; ILO, 2010a, b).  
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fewer hours without suffering a commensurate drop in earnings. The number of workers 
covered  by  the  measure  exceeded  1.5  million  in  May  2009,  and  has  since  begun  to 
decline. An in-depth analysis conducted by the Federal Employment Service in October 
2009 concluded that in the month of June 2009 there was an average reduction in working 
time  of  30.5  per  cent,  corresponding  to  the  preservation  of  about  432,000  full-time 
equivalent jobs. A job loss of such magnitude would have added one percentage point to 
the unemployment rate. It can thus be argued that an “implicit tripartism” contributed to 
limit the adverse effects on the German labour market (Freyssinet, 2010, p. 26). 
In  addition,  numerous  sectoral  collective  bargaining  agreements  exchanged  pay 
freezes for limits on redundancies.  
The  German  case  illustrates  the  LCSF  configuration  which  is  typical  of  various 
European countries. In most circumstances this configuration leads to a social dialogue 
response. The peculiarity of Germany is that the response does not take the form of a 
national pact but mostly of sectoral agreements. 
Switzerland  
Switzerland has been moderately hit by the global economic crisis. Real GDP grew 
by 1.8 per cent in 2008, but the growth rate became negative by 1.5 per cent in 2009. 
Therefore, the crisis qualifies as serious according to the criterion adopted in this study. 
The growth rate had been around 3 per cent in the previous years. Available forecasts 
suggest growth rates of 1.7 and 1.4 per cent for 2010 and 2011. Unemployment increased 
from 2.5 per cent in the autumn of 2008 to 3.5 per cent in the spring of 2009, reaching 4.5 
per cent in early 2010 and continuously moving downwards to 3.8 per cent at the time of 
writing this report. 
Similar to Germany, the country has a tradition of “embedded corporatism” in the 
sense that the unions and employers are routinely consulted during the process of public 
policy elaboration. Labour law respects basic trade union rights. Union density is around 
20 per cent and collective bargaining coverage considerably higher. 
As with Germany, there was no formal national tripartite social pact in response to 
the crisis in Switzerland. However, the concerned interest groups were incorporated into 
the usual consultation procedures of the relevant ministries and also through existing 
networks and informal contacts. In addition, and again like Germany, measures aimed to 
subsidize  reduced  working  hours  in  exchange  for  relative  employment  stability  were 
negotiated at the sectoral and industry level (ILO, 2010a).
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The Swiss case also illustrates the LCSF configuration. Even more than Germany, 
however, the social dialogue response is carried by a network of formal and informal 
exchanges which routinely involve trade unions and employer associations in the shaping 
of public policy. 
 
 
10 This section has drawn on a review of newspaper articles in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Le 
Temps,  and  Tages  Anzeiger  Newspapers  conducted  in  July  2010,  as  well  as  on  telephone 
interviews with representatives of SECO (State Secretariat for Economic Affairs), the employer 
association Economiesuisse, and the trade union confederation SGB/USS.   
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Ireland  
Ireland is, with Latvia and Russia, one of the countries in the sample in which the 
crisis has hit hardest. The economy contracted by 3.5 per cent in 2008 and by 7.6 per cent 
in 2009, after having experienced robust growth rates during the preceding years. It is still 
forecast to climb out of the recession in 2010 and to resume growth at a rate of 0.9 per 
cent in 2011. However, at present, these forecasts appear wildly optimistic, given fears 
about Ireland’s inability to refinance its public debt. The unemployment rate increased 
from around 5 to 7 per cent in August 2008, 9.4 per cent in January 2009, and 13 per cent 
in the summer of 2009. There is no sign that it will go down in the near future. 
Since 1987, Ireland has been the country of “social partnership”, which manifested 
itself as periodic three-year agreements among the social partners on all major policy 
issues  (Baccaro  and  Simoni,  2007;  Roche,  2007).  Union  density  has  been  declining 
rapidly over the past years, but is still well above the 20 per cent mark. Similar to other 
western European countries, there are no major violations of trade union rights. 
Ireland entered the early-crisis period with a public display of support for the social 
partnership  system.  In  November  2008  a  national  pact  was  signed:  the  Transitional 
Agreement extending towards the 2016 partnership pact adopted in 2006. It received 
record union support. This is not particularly surprising as the new agreement provided 
for a 6 per cent pay increase over 21 months. The provisions of this pact would soon 
prove obsolete. 
In  fact,  in  January  2009  the  worsening  of  the  economic  and  financial  situation 
pushed the government to request a freezing of wages in the public sector, at least until 
the end of 2010, as well as nominal wage cuts in the form of a pension levy. Collective 
bargaining  negotiations  failed  and the  government  implemented  the  desired measures 
unilaterally.  Negotiations  restarted  in  April  2009,  but  in  September  2009  the  Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions was forced by the government’s intransigence to introduce a 
new  strategy  of  opposition  accompanied  by  strike  threats.  In  December  2009,  the 
government unilaterally decided to introduce a nominal wage cut of 7 per cent for public 
servants in 2010, and the Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation (IBEC) formally 
withdrew from the private sector pay agreement that had been negotiated as part of the 
Transitional Agreement in 2008. This paved the way for the first period of company-level 
bargaining in Irish industrial relations since 1987. These decisions effectively put an end 
to the Irish social partnership as it had been known until then.  
However, the unions’ strategy of mobilization was short-lived. Attempts to mobilize 
the members against unilateral restructuring met with opposition from other sections of 
Irish society. In March 2010 IBEC and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) agreed 
to a protocol providing negotiators with broad pay guidelines and additional criteria for 
managing  private  sector  pay  claims.  In  June,  a  similar  deal  was  signed  between  the 
government and the public sector unions (the “Croke Park agreement”). This established 
a four-year wage freeze and a peace clause. Thus, although social partnership is formally 
dead, the parties really see no alternative to the centralized negotiation of wages and 
working conditions (Rychly, 2009; Freyssinet, 2010, p. 12ff).  
The  Irish  case  is  also  an  illustration  of  the  LCSF  configuration.  However,  the 
outcome is that negotiations fail and the government proceeds unilaterally. The unusual 
depth of the crisis pushes the government to seek implementation of a series of harsh 
measures  in  a  very  short  time.  The  unions  disagree  with  them.  However,  they  are 
ultimately unable to alter the government’s course.  
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Spain 
Spain’s economy contracted by 3.6 per cent in 2009. It is forecasted to experience 
negative growth (-0.4 per cent) again in 2010, before resuming growth in 2011 at a rate of 
0.6 per cent. Unemployment rates climbed from less than 10 per cent in early 2008 to 18 
per cent in early 2009, and – after a slight improvement in the first half of 2009 – peaked 
at 20.3 per cent in March 2010. 
The country has a recent tradition of social dialogue at the national level: beginning 
with  the  early  2000s,  unions  and  employers  have  negotiated  centralized  wage-setting 
agreements every year. In the 1990s unions and employers were also sometimes involved 
in tripartite negotiations with the government over social and labour market policy. The 
union density is low in comparative perspective (well-below 20 per cent) and therefore 
the unions are weak according to the definition adopted in this study. Just like in other 
western European countries, basic trade union rights are guaranteed. 
The Spanish government resorted to social dialogue at the beginning of the crisis to 
formulate  joint  principles  with  the  employers  and  the  unions  on  how  to  tackle  the 
recession  (common  declaration  on  29  July  2008).  However,  views  concerning  the 
appropriate  measures  to  be  taken  soon  began  to  diverge  and  the  parties  reached  a 
deadlock in January 2009. Attempts to renew the national social pact broke down in 
March 2009. In spring 2010, with a severely deteriorated macroeconomic and financial 
situation, social dialogue was considered to have officially broken down. On 16 June 
2010, the Government approved a labour reform by decree, i.e. without the support of 
employers’ and workers’ organizations. The reform introduced a flexibilization of labour 
market regulation, i.e. the possibility for companies to lay-off workers at lower costs. 
Additional austerity measures were also introduced and they, too, met with dissent from 
the social partners (Demetriades and Kullander, 2009, p. 19 and 26; Freyssinet, 2010, p. 
20ff).
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The Spanish case is an illustration of the LCsF configuration. It is in many respects 
similar to the Irish case. Here too, a far-reaching economic and financial crisis pushes the 
government  into  adopting  measures  of  fiscal  retrenchment  and  labour  market 
flexibilization that the unions are unable to live with. However, the unions here are even 
less strong than in Ireland and thus unable to fundamentally alter the adjustment plan.  
Czech Republic 
The financial crisis has had a serious impact on the Czech Republic as the economy 
contracted by 4.1 per cent in 2009. It is forecast to return to growth again at a rate of 0.9 
per cent in 2010 and 2.0 per cent in 2011. Unemployment had reached a three-year low of 
4.1 per cent in the summer of 2008, but climbed to 6 per cent in early 2009 and reached 
8.2  per  cent  in  February  2010.  There  is  a  clearly  discernible  trend  towards  an 
improvement of the situation at the time of writing this report. 
Like other former communist nations, the country has no tradition of tripartite social 
dialogue as defined above. Although, frequently, there were tripartite negotiations in the 
1990s and early 2000s, these were largely symbolic and never issued in a meaningful 
social pact (Ost, 2000; Avdagic, 2005; Héthy, 2009). The union density rate is about 20 
 
 
11 This section has also drawn on newspaper articles published by El País.  
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per cent and is one of the highest in the region, thus justifying the country code of “strong 
unionism”. The labour code generally protects basic trade union rights. 
Yet, surprisingly given the country’s record, the response to the financial crisis has 
taken the form of national social dialogue. In 2009, unions and employer organizations 
took the initiative of presenting the government with a set of jointly-negotiated measures 
to tackle the crisis. These included measures to support aggregate demand (e.g. the “car-
scrapping” bonus), price controls on utility services, the introduction of a value-added 
tax, and vocational training measures (Héthy, 2009).  
In February 2010, the tripartite social partners agreed to 38 anti-crisis measures. 
These included measures preventing misuse of unemployment benefits, the softening of 
administrative  and  financial  burdens  on  firms,  and  various  projects  aimed  to  lower 
unemployment. The social partners later criticized the implementation of the 38 measures 
as inadequate (ILO, 2010a). 
This case is an illustration of the lCSF configuration: when the crisis hits hard and 
the unions are strong there is no need for a previous tripartite legacy for a social pact to 
materialize. The Czech social pact is a first for the country. However, in light of social 
partner criticism, it is unclear that the government is living up to the expectations that it 
has generated by signing the pact. 
Hungary
12 
The economic impact of the crisis on Hungary has been one of the deepest. The 
economy contracted by 6.3 per cent of GDP in 2009. It is forecast to grow again at a rate 
of 0.3 per cent for 2010 and 2.5 per cent for 2011. Unemployment climbed from 7.6 per 
cent in October 2008 to 10 per cent in March 2009, and reached 11.9 per cent in February 
2010. There appears to be an improvement of the unemployment outlook, with rates 
falling to 10.2 per cent in May 2010. 
Hungary has no tradition of corporatist policy-making as the repeated attempts to 
strike a social pact in the previous decade were unsuccessful. Union density is less than 
20 per cent. There are no fundamental violations of trade union rights.  
In  responding  to  the  crisis,  the  Hungarian  government  was  fundamentally 
constrained by a highly inhospitable macroeconomic situation, which pushed them to 
implement a heavy programme of fiscal retrenchment. Attempts were made to gain the 
consensus  of  the  social  partners  around  austerity  measures,  but  largely  to  no  avail. 
Hungary’s Prime Minister called for a national summit on 18 October 2008. Leaders of 
all political parties, financial experts and social partners gathered to discuss the effects of 
the  global  economic  crisis.  The  objective  of  the  top-level  negotiations,  held  between 
September 2008 and January 2009, was to reach consensus on a broad package of reforms 
in key areas. However, strong divisions emerged between the social partners and no pact 
was signed. 
Hungary’s highest social dialogue institution, the National Council of Reconciliation 
of Interests (OÉT), has achieved two agreements since the beginning of the crisis, one in 
2008 and one in 2009. Both updated the minimum wage. However, these were minor 
 
 
12 The section draws on (Demetriades and Kullander, 2009, p. 20; Héthy, 2009, p. 10; Rychly, 
2009; ILO, 2010a).  
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agreements which do not fundamentally alter the fact that despite repeated governmental 
efforts,  no  social  dialogue  consensus  could  be  reached  in  Hungary  and  that  the 
government’s response was essentially unilateral. 
The Hungarian case is an illustration of the lCsF configuration. Unlike the Czech 




After  a  period  of  robust  economic  growth  which  led  to  a  decline  in  income 
inequality and employment expansion, Brazil’s GDP experienced a small negative growth 
in 2009 followed by a strong rebound in 2010. Unemployment levels reached the pre-
crisis level of approximately 8 per cent in the third quarter of 2009, with a generally 
positive outlook for 2010 both in terms of growth and employment. 
Brazil has no legacy of tripartite policy-making, as no social pacts or equivalent 
forms of embedded corporatism could be seen in the previous decade. Union density rates 
are less than 20 per cent according to available estimates. Despite some concerns about 
allowing  multiple  unionism,  overall  basic  trade  union  rights  seem  respected  in  the 
country. 
Brazil’s  response  to  the  crisis  has  involved  national-level  social  dialogue.  The 
Conselho  de  Desenvolvimento  Econômico  e  Social  (CDES),  a  consultative  council 
composed of governments and members of civil society (whose membership is broader 
than  trade  unions  and  employer  associations  as  it  involves  other  civil  society 
organizations),  created  a  special  group  to  monitor  the  crisis  and  propose  adequate 
responses. In October 2008 it issued a motion making various suggestions, concerning 
inter alia credit expansion, public investment, and employment protection, which later 
found their way into the government’s policy packet.   
In  early  2009,  the  tripartite  Conselho  Deliberativo  do  Fundo  de  Amparo  ao 
Trabalhador (CODEFAT) approved an extension of unemployment benefits from five to 
seven months for workers in sectors particularly affected by the economic downturn, a 
measure  which  benefited  more  than  320,000  workers.  As  a  reaction  to  rising 
unemployment,  the  CODEFAT  also  approved  a  resolution  stipulating  an  alternative 
employment  protection  programme,  the  Worker  Qualification  Programme  (Bolsa  de 
Qualificação  do  Trabalhador),  which  allows  employers,  under  certain  conditions,  to 
temporarily  suspend  contracts  and  provide  worker  qualification  training  during  the 
corresponding period.  
The Brazilian case is another example of the lCSF configuration. Like the Czech 
case, it illustrates that a tripartite legacy is not a necessary condition for a social dialogue 
response if other conditions are in place. 
   
 
 
13 This section draws on (Ghellab, 2009, p.: 6; ILO, 2009a, p.: 13; Rychly, 2009; ILO, 2010a).  
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South Africa 
South Africa has been significantly hit by the global economic crisis, as its economy 
contracted by 1.8 per cent in 2009, having experienced growth rates of 3.7 to 5.6 per cent 
in the preceding five years. It is forecast to grow again at the rate of 2.8 per cent in 2010 
and 3.7 per cent in 2011. Unemployment rates are traditionally extremely high in South 
Africa.  After  experiencing  a  two-year  low  of  21.9  per  cent  at  the  end  of  2008, 
unemployment reached 24.5 per cent in the summer 2009 and peaked at 25.2 per cent in 
January 2010. 
South Africa is one of the few non-European countries to have developed a tradition 
of tripartite policy-making. After the establishment of NEDLAC in 1994, the national 
economic  and  labour  council,  virtually  all  major  public  policy  decisions  have  been 
formally discussed with the social partners (Keller and Nkadimeng, 2005; Papadakis, 
2006). The South Africa labour movement is one of the strongest in developing countries. 
The unionization rate is higher than 20 per cent, and the unions are both organizationally 
strong (especially in sectors like mining and the public sector) and highly influential. 
Since 1994, the country’s labour legislation and practice fully allows for trade union 
freedoms and rights. 
Much  of  South  Africa’s  response  to  the  financial  crisis  was  processed  through 
NEDLAC.  The  consultation  process  began  in  December  2008  and  resulted  in  the 
“Framework  for  South  Africa's  response  to  the  international  economic  crisis”  on  19 
February  2009,  to  be  implemented and  monitored through  action  plans  and  five  task 
teams. This framework agreement identified six key platforms on which the response to 
the crisis should be based: investment in public infrastructure, macroeconomic policy, 
industrial and trade policy, employment and social measures, global coordination and 
social partnership. Unions were concerned that the crisis could be used by companies as a 
pretext  to  cut  jobs  and  maximize  profits,  but  nonetheless  strongly  endorsed  the 
agreement, which in their opinion staved off the risk that the burden of the crisis would be 
unfairly shifted onto the poor and vulnerable. In early 2010, however, Cosatu’s leader 
Vavi expressed concern at what he perceived to be an insufficient implementation of the 
plan (Ghellab, 2009; Rychly, 2009). 
The South African case exemplifies the LCSF configuration. It illustrates that strong 
and  durable  social  dialogue  is  possible  even  outside  of  the  European  continent  if 
appropriate institutions are in place and the unions are strong and representative enough 
to make them meaningful. 
Japan 
In Japan the global financial crisis interrupted the fragile recovery that had followed 
the “lost decade”. The economy declined both in 2008 (1.2 per cent) and in 2009 (5.3 per 
cent).  Economic  growth  had  averaged  1.7  per  cent  between  2000  and  2007. 
Unemployment rose modestly from around 4 per cent in 2008 to a peak of 5.5 per cent in 
September 2009. 
Explicit national tripartite policy-making has never been a characteristic of Japan. 
The unions are weak (the union density rate is less than 20 per cent) and mostly organized 
at the enterprise level. Freedom of trade union association is generally guaranteed. 
Despite  the  absence  of  a  corporatist  legacy,  the  social  partners  reached  an 
Agreement for Job Stability and Employment Creation in March 2009 as part of the 
annual spring wage negotiations (shunto). The agreement contained various measures 
aimed  at  maintaining  employment  through  work-sharing  arrangements  backed  by  the  
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Government  through  employment  subsidies.  The  measures  were  to  be  implemented 
through  company-level  negotiations.  The  work-sharing  arrangements  included  shorter 
hours,  the  banning  of  overtime,  and  the  temporary  internal  transfer  of  workers  from 
companies  in  sectors  facing  declining  demand  to  sectors  with  better  employment 
opportunities within the same group. Other elements of the tripartite agreement were the 
strengthening of the employment safety net through measures such as vocational training 
and  job  placement  services,  assistance  (living  assistance,  housing  assistance,  and  job 
counseling) to single mothers, “freeters” (people between the age of 15-34 who lack full-
time regular employment or are unemployed), and the long-term unemployed who might 
no  longer  be  eligible  for  unemployment  benefits,  as  well  as  public  job  creation, 
particularly in medical care, nursing, daycare, the environment, agriculture, and forestry 
(ILO, 2010c). 
In the 2010 shunto, the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (RENGO) and the 
Japanese  Business  Federation  (Nippon  Keidanren)  agreed  to  mutual  concessions:  the 
employers gave up on their demand for a wage freeze, and the unions agreed to press for 
wage  increases  only  in  those  companies  where  the  economic  situation  made  them 
compatible with the goal of maximizing employment security.
14 
The Japanese case illustrates the lCsF configuration. Unlike the Hungarian case, this 
leads here to a positive social dialogue outcome. The peculiarity of the case is that social 
concerns  about  maximizing  employment  were  internalized  in  the  routine  collective 
bargaining process of the annual shunto. The government sought to facilitate the reaching 
of  an  agreement  between  the  bipartite  partners  by  strengthening  the  safety  net  and 
providing labour market assistance to vulnerable workers. 
Korea 
Although the global financial crisis provoked a drop in Korea’s growth rate, it did 
not lead to negative growth (unlike the Asian crisis of 1997). The economy grew by 0.2 
per cent in 2009, having expanded at an annual rate of 3 to 7 per cent between 2002 and 
2007. It is currently experiencing a strong recovery. Unemployment rates climbed from 
3.0 per cent in the autumn of 2008 to 4.0 per cent in March 2009, peaked at 5 per cent in 
January 2010, and have declined ever since. 
Korea is one of the few non-European countries to have developed a tradition of 
tripartite dialogue in the years that followed the Asian crisis. In 1998 the social partners 
signed  a  social  pact  (Baccaro  and  Lim,  2007)  within  the  framework  of  the  Korea 
Tripartite Commission. However, one of the two major union confederations, the KCTU, 
has  often refused  to take  part in the  Commission’s  deliberations. The Korean  labour 
movement is weak in comparative perspective: the union density rate is well below 20 per 
cent and the organizational strength of the labour movement is concentrated in large 
enterprises, but virtually absent elsewhere. Labour law is not fully compliant with ILO 
labour  standards  on  freedom  of  association.  Nonetheless,  unions  do  organize  and 
mobilize. This justifies the coding of the country as allowing for free unions. 
The initiative for a social dialogue response to the crisis originated from unions and 
employers.  In  October  2008,  the  Tripartite  Commission  proposed  a  social  pact  to 
overcome the crisis. In January 2009, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) 
and the Korea Employers Federation (KEP) jointly met the press and suggested holding a 
 
 
14 The section on Japan has drawn on unpublished documents provided by Ebisui Minawa, ILO.  
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quadripartite meeting involving government and civil society as well. In February 2009, 
after several meetings, the representatives of the four parties adopted a Quadripartite Pact 
for Overcoming the Economic Crisis.  
The pact included a work-sharing effort by workers, a commitment to limiting job 
losses  by  employers,  and  financial  support  by  government  partially  making  up  for 
workers’ income losses and providing for a limited extension of the social safety net 
(ILO, 2010a). 
However, the other major trade union confederation KCTU did not participate in the 
negotiations for the social pact. When the agreement was signed, it released a statement 
stating that the agreement unduly penalized the workers. 
The Korean case provides a unique illustration of the LcsF configuration. Neither 
the  crisis  is  particularly  serious  nor  are  the  unions  particularly  strong.  However,  the 
presence  of  a  policy  and institutional legacy  of tripartism  is sufficient to  lead  to  the 
signature of a social pact. Given the non-participation of the KCTU and the recent history 
of other pacts signed within the Korea Tripartite Commission, there are reasons to believe 
that the pact is purely cosmetic and the its impact on policy will be limited. 
8.   Concluding remarks  
The Boolean analysis has led to the following conclusions: 1) freedom of association 
is necessary and jointly sufficient (when a number of other factors are present) for a 
social dialogue response to the crisis to emerge; 2) the absence of freedom of association 
is sufficient to produce the absence of social dialogue although social dialogue may be 
absent or fail when trade union rights are guaranteed; 3) social dialogue frequently does 
not emerge either when the crisis hits hard and the unions do not have the organizational 
resources to impose their presence to governments, or when the crisis is less than a full 
emergency and the unions are so strong that governments fear having to pay too high a 
price to them in negotiations. 
The  analysis  suggests  that  social  dialogue  cannot  exist  without  freedom  of 
association. Therefore, one clear policy implication emerges: if national and international 
policy-makers  believe  that  social  dialogue  is  an  efficient  and  equitable  response  to 
economic  emergency,  they  should  endeavour  to  strengthen  freedom  of  association  in 
contexts in which it is not currently guaranteed.  
Future research should extend the analysis performed here in two directions. First, 
the explanatory model should be made more complex by introducing considerations of 
government strength or weakness. As argued above, the existing literature puts a lot of 
emphasis on the governments’ incentives to engage in social dialogue or the lack thereof 
(Baccaro and Simoni, 2008; Hamann and Kelly, 2010; Avdagic and Rhodes and Visser, 
2011). Second, the transition to a fuzzy-set, as opposed to crisp-set, methodology seems 
desirable (Ragin, 2000). While keeping the strong points of a Boolean methodology – 
analysing  configurations  of  factors  as  opposed  to  mean  effects  and  allowing  for 
equifinality in the production of the outcome – this methodology would permit coding 
countries in terms of degrees of membership in a particular set and would lead to a more 
nuanced analysis. 
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Table 1: Coding of the Social Dialogue Variable 
      Social Dialogue  Notes 
Africa  Cameroon  0    
   Egypt  0    
   Nigeria  0    
   Senegal  0 
No social pact: there was a tripartite pact on minimum wages but 
negotiations started before (in 2007) and do not seem strictly connected 
to the crisis response. 
   South Africa  1 
Social pact: Investment in public infrastructure; countercyclical fiscal 
policy (stimulus package); public works; industrial policy protecting 
struggling sectors (e.g. textiles and apparel); various social policies (e.g. 
unemployment benefits, food grants).  
   Rwanda  0    
   Tanzania  0    
   Uganda  0    
Americas  Argentina  0 
No true social dialogue response; increase of minimum salary; 
enterprise level agreements cutting wages (70%) or hours (30%). 
   Brazil  1  Tripartite extension of unemployment benefits; retraining measures. 
   Canada  0    
   Chile  1 
Tripartite measures favoring employment retention, training, and social 
protection. 
   Colombia  0    
   Costa Rica  0    
   Mexico  0    
   Peru  0    
   United States  0    
   Uruguay  0    
Caribbean  Jamaica  1 
Kingston Plan' (Caribbean-wide tripartite initiative sponsored by the 
ILO). 
   Trinidad and Tobago  0 
Although in theory covered by the Kingston Plan, a nation-wide 
machinery for social dialogue still does not exist and the actors have 
made commitments to establish it. 
Europe  Bulgaria  0 
Government acted unilaterally for the most part: increase in minimum 
wage; more generous unemployment benefits; extension of food 
voucher system; subsidized employment; erga omnes extension of 
sectoral agreements. 
   Czech Republic  1 
Tripartite agreement: 38 short-term anti-crisis measures: preventing 
misuse of unemployment benefits, reduction of taxes on employees, 
social housing, training measures.  
   France  0 
No social dialogue response but agreement extending partial 
unemployment insurance. 
   Germany  1 
No national agreement, but sectoral agreements on Kurzarbeit; national 
consultations on crisis response. 
   Hungary  0  No pact; minimum wage increases. 
   Ireland  0  Failed negotiations. 
   Italy  1 
Minor agreements: (January 2009) Reform of contractual arrangements 
(stimulating decentralization); (February 2010) Framework agreement 
on the training of unemployed and mobility workers; sectoral 
cooperation on weathering the crisis. 
   Latvia  0 
Harsh budget increases and tax cuts discussed with the social partners 
but implemented by government despite their disagreement.  
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      Social Dialogue  Notes 
   Netherlands  1 
Crisis response negotiated with the trade unions. Measures include 
labour market and education; infrastructure; sustainability and 
innovation; and maintaining benefit levels.  In exchange unions provide 
wage moderation and employers commit not to raise the issue of 
pension age increase. 
   Poland  1 
Social partners negotiate crisis response in March 2009; government 
passes them into two bills but then social partners claim government 
has ignored their proposals. 
   Romania  0 
Although the government claims that the anti-crisis measures have been 
agreed with the social partners, the partners dispute the claim and 
protest again the 'reform' of the public sector pay system. 
   Russia  0  Social partner consultation only. 
   Spain  0 
Social dialogue broke over the government's response to the crisis, but 
a national framework agreement over wages was then signed. 
   Switzerland  1  Informal consultations at the national level; sectoral negotiations. 
   Sweden  1  Sectoral agreements on temporary lay-offs and training. 
   Serbia  0  Consultations with a tripartite crisis working group but no agreement. 
   United Kingdom  0    
Asia  Australia  0    
   Cambodia  0  Sectoral tripartite meetings held but no real agreement. 
   Japan  1 
March 2009: Framework Agreement for Job Stability and Employment 
Creation. 
   Korea  1 
February 2009: Grand Agreement to Overcome the Economic Crisis; 
KCTU does not participate. 
   Malaysia  0    
   Thailand  0  Sectoral consultations. 
   Vietnam  0    
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Table 2: Independent Variables 
 
 
      Legacy  Crisis 
Strong 
Unions  FoA 
Africa  Cameroon  0  0  0  0 
   Egypt  0  0  0  0 
   Nigeria  0  0  0  0 
   Senegal  0  0  0  1 
   South Africa  1  1  1  1 
   Rwanda  0  0  0  0 
   Tanzania  0  0  0  0 
   Uganda  0  0  0  0 
Americas  Argentina  0  0  1  1 
   Brazil  0  1  1  1 
   Canada  0  1  1  1 
   Chile  0  1  0  1 
   Colombia  0  0  0  0 
   Costa Rica  0  1  0  0 
   Mexico  0  1  0  0 
   Peru  0  0  0  1 
   United States  0  1  0  1 
   Uruguay  0  0  0  1 
Caribbean  Jamaica  0  1  0  1 
  
Trinidad and 
Tobago  0  1  0  0 
Europe  Bulgaria  0  1  1  1 
   Czech Republic  0  1  1  1 
   France  0  1  0  1 
   Germany  1  1  1  1 
   Hungary  0  1  0  1 
   Ireland  1  1  1  1 
   Italy  1  1  1  1 
   Latvia  0  1  0  1 
   Netherlands  1  1  1  1 
   Poland  0  0  0  1 
   Romania  0  1  1  1 
   Russia  0  1  1  0 
   Spain  1  1  0  1 
   Switzerland  1  1  1  1 
   Sweden  1  1  1  1 
   Serbia  0  1  1  0 
   United Kingdom  0  1  1  1 
Asia  Australia  0  0  0  1 
   Cambodia  0  1  0  0 
   Japan  0  1  0  1 
   Korea  1  0  0  1 
   Malaysia  0  1  0  0 
   Thailand  0  1  0  0 
   Vietnam  0  0  0  0  
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Table 3: Truth Table and Distribution of Cases* 
Legacy  Crisis 
Strength 
Unions  FoA  Cases  Countries  Frequency  Frequency>0  Frequency>.5 
0  0  0  0  8 
Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Colombia, 
Vietnam  0.00  0  0 
0  0  0  1  5  Senegal, Peru, Uruguay, Poland, Australia  0.20  1  0 
0  0  1  0  0             
0  0  1  1  1  Argentina  0.00  0  0 
0  1  0  0  6  Costa Rica, Trinidad, Mexico, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand  0.00  0  0 
0  1  0  1  7  Chile, US, France, Jamaica, Hungary, Latvia, Japan  0.43  1  0 
0  1  1  0  2  Russia, Serbia  0.00  0  0 
0  1  1  1  6  Brazil, Canada, Bulgaria, Check Rep, Romania, UK  0.33  1  0 
1  0  0  0  0             
1  0  0  1  1  Korea  1.00  1  1 
1  0  1  0  0             
1  0  1  1  0             
1  1  0  0  0             
1  1  0  1  1  Spain  0.00  0  0 
1  1  1  0  0             
1  1  1  1  7 
South Africa, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Sweden  0.86  1  1 
*Positive cases in bold  
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